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Abstract
Baumeister, Stillwell and Heatherton (1994) argue that guilt serves primarily
interpersonal functions and take issue with more traditional intrapsychic accounts of
guilty feelings, in which causality, responsibility, and blame are emphasized. We
examined the validity of these claims by asking 198 college students to imagine that they
destroyed the valued property of either their best friend or mother, under each of three
conditions of causal responsibility (accidental, foreseeable, unjustifiably intended). They
then rated the reactions they anticipated from the victim (anger, disappointment; change
in impression of the perpetrator), their perceived blameworthiness, aspects of causality,
and how guilty they would feel immediately after perpetrating the harm as well as an
entire day later. Imagined guilt was curvilinearly related to responsibility at time 1, but
linearly at time 2. Results suggest that people only weigh interpersonal concerns more
heavily after time has elapsed, but that both factors integrally affect feelings of guilt.#
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INTRODUCTION
Analyses of the antecedents to guilty feelings in adults emphasize the crucial role
played by one’s condition or state of being guilty (legal notion of mens rea). A
central idea in this literature is that feelings of guilt are aroused by a sense of
blameworthiness for one’s harmful behaviour (e.g. De Rivera, 1984; Izard, 1977;
Shavez, 1985; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Wicker, Payne & Morgan, 1983). Viewed,
for example, in terms of Heider’s (1958) analysis of personal responsibility, the actor
should experience progressively greater blameworthiness and ever increasing feelings
of guilt upon committing a harmful transgression that was accidental (i.e. unforeseen
and unintended), foreseeable (i.e. foreseen, but unintended), justifiably intended (i.e.
foreseen, intended, but for justifiable motives), and unjustifiably intended (i.e.
foreseen, intended, and unacceptably motivated). However, as McGraw’s (1987)
research and only a moment of personal reflection will reveal, there is not necessarily
a one-to-one correspondence between self-ascribed responsibility and one’s feelings
of guilt. Many inmates know they are technically ‘guilty’ of the crimes for which they
were sentenced, and yet they may feel no guilt whatsoever for the misdeed. The
opposite extreme is also easily imaginable— think, for example, of battered spouses,
survivors of murder, victims or natural catastrophes, and war veterans who suffer
tremendous feelings of guilt for their plight, but whom others would not hold
responsible (casus quo assign guilt).
Baumeister, Stillwell and Heatherton (1994), in fact, claim that these traditional
accounts mistakenly emphasize the private, intrapsychic, and largely self-evaluative
bases for feelings of guilt. From their perspective, guilty feelings derive
fundamentally from concern about breaches in interpersonal relationships, and
involve a consequent desire to avoid losing the relationship or disrupting communal
bonds. Guilty feelings thus serve critical interpersonal functions. Guilt encourages us
to attempt to repair a damaged relationship, engage in equity-restoring behaviours,
and can be used to reestablish emotional balance by reallocating some of the victim’s
distress to the perpetrator.
One fallacious, or at least exaggerated, source of guilt according to Baumeister et
al. includes what they call ‘intrapsychic factors’ such as intentionality, blame,
responsibility, choice, or mitigating circumstances. In their view, ‘perceiving the self
as responsible is neither necessary nor sufficient to produce guilt feelings’ since
‘people feel guilty for accidental transgressions as well as for voluntary ones’ (1994,
p. 261). Concepts such as intent and blame or responsibility therefore matter more
after feelings of guilt have already been aroused. People can use excuses such as ‘it
was an accident’ and ‘I didn’t mean to’ or justifications as in ‘It was really her fault’
to escape from, or reduce, feelings of guilt that none the less are basically
interpersonal in origin. At best, intent, self-blame, and responsibility indirectly
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impact the magnitude of one’s guilty feelings, because of what they imply about the
perpetrator’s attitude toward the relationship in question.
There is a curious discrepancy between Baumeister et al.’s conceptualization of
guilty feelings and certain empirical findings, however. Baumeister et al. argue that
‘. . . voluntary, intentional transgressions represent a greater threat to the
relationship than do involuntary or accidental ones, and so a stronger guilt
response would be warranted’ (1994, p. 262). Well-known findings reported by
McGraw (1987), unfortunately, contradict this prediction. McGraw showed that
perpetrators of interpersonal harm report greater feelings of guilt after having
committed the act unintentionally rather than intentionally even though they see
themselves as more blameworthy for the latter. Her findings are reminiscent of those
reported in the transgression-compliance area (e.g. Brock & Buss, 1964; Carlsmith &
Gross, 1969; Freedman, Wallington & Bless, 1967). Compliance to a request, which
appears to occur in the interest of guilt reduction, increased dramatically following
accidental transgressions, but not following intentional ones. The findings reported
by McGraw are also quite robust— she reports the same pattern of results regardless
of whether participants responded to hypothetical imagined events or more
narrative, autobiographical accounts of accidental, foreseeable, or unjustifiably
intended harm (cf. Studies 1 versus 2). McGraw also reports the same findings using
a within- or between-subjects design.
McGraw explains these findings in terms of important temporal dynamics
involved in reducing feelings of guilt. Specifically, perpetrators of intentional harm
(especially when they know that it will be seen as unjustified) presumably anticipate
feeling guilty before causing it, because the desire to violate a norm is present at that
time. In order to reduce the projected guilty feelings, perpetrators essentially justify
or rationalize the act before it even takes place. In this way, perpetrators can proceed
to intentionally commit the act which is so instrumental to achieving the desired
goal. In contrast, since there is no a priori intention to cause harm in the case of an
accident, perpetrators have no effective means of reducing feelings of guilt after the
misdeed has taken place. Actors, in this case, thus experience relatively greater
immediate post-transgression feelings of guilt.
Like Baumeister et al.’s ideas, McGraw’s findings are intuitively appealing, but
also paradoxical. First, they dispute a long-standing literature which, at the very
least, implies that intent, self-blame, and feelings of guilt are positively related to one
another (e.g. Fincham & Jaspars, 1980; Heider, 1958). Second, they suggest that one
rarely feels guilty for intentionally violating normative standards, yet experiences in
everyday life and literature clearly contradict this premise (Gerard, 1993).
It is possible to explain such inconsistencies, however, by juxtaposing McGraw’s
emphasis on the temporality of events with Baumeister et al.’s focus on guilt’s
interpersonal origins. A logical extension of these analyses is that immediate post-
transgression feelings of guilt may not be greater for intentional than accidental
harm, but that delayed feelings of guilt would be. In the heat of the moment ensuing
immediately after committing a transgression, perpetrators are going to focus more
on their behaviour and its results rather than on their relationships with others. In
cases where behaviour was intended, perpetrators will be satisfied for having
achieved what they desired. This satisfaction will operate against arousing any
negatively valenced emotion (including the feeling of guilt). In contrast, a focus on
harmful behavioural results that were not intended will probably facilitate negative
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emotional reactions. These reactions are evoked because of the unexpected and
undesired quality of the event, and concomitant lack of excuses or justifications for
its occurrence.
The situation changes as time passes. With time and decreased physiological
activation, transgressors can contemplate their accountability for the harmful event,
how their involvement in it reflects on them as a person, and how this might impact
relationships with others. Perpetrators thus take a broader look at the event,
observing the self from the perspective of one’s own and significant others’ standards
or ideals. If a part of those ideals embodies showing consideration for others’
welfare, a more positive relationship would be expected between intent, self-blame,
and delayed feelings of guilt. In fact, it is these protracted feelings of guilt rather than
those experienced earlier that well exemplify the Baumeister et al. analysis.
In line with this analysis, the purpose of the present study is to investigate the time
course of adults’ feelings of guilt in relation to their interpersonal concerns and the
intrapsychic factors of intent and self-blame. The most straightforward way to test
our hypotheses would be to actually induce feelings of guilt, by placing individuals in
experimental situations in which they ostensibly harmed a victim accidentally,
foreseeably, or with malevolent intent. We could then take self-report or
observational measures of the intensity of respondents’ feelings of guilt
immediately after the event and after some time had passed. Needless to say, it
would be difficult both practically and ethically to successfully manipulate in a
tightly controlled fashion a person’s level of responsibility for harm.
A more practically feasible method for testing our hypotheses is available, if one is
prepared to make two rather modest assumptions. The first is that people are able to
imagine that they would cause harm to a victim accidentally, foreseeably or
malevolently. This assumption is not at all far-fetched. It has been shown repeatedly
that subjects can easily generate examples of such events from their own life
histories. McGraw’s (1987) own research certainly shows this (Study 2) as do various
recent studies of adults’ narrative reports of guilt (e.g. Baumeister, Stillwell &
Heatherton, 1995; Tangney, 1992). A second assumption is that the guilty feelings
reported based on personal experience are not qualitatively different from the guilty
feelings reported in response to imagined experiences. This assumption is also not
far-fetched, as seen in the similar results reported by McGraw in hypothetical (Study
I) and real-life situations (Study 2) for ratings of guilt and in the factors affecting
ratings of guilt1.
Recent research thus supports the idea that imagined feelings of guilt in imagined
situations yield results similar to reports of guilt based on real-life experiences. We
should not be surprised at these findings. After all, Tomkins (1987, 1992) claimed
that people have scripts about emotion that are built on past experience and that
serve as analogies when reacting emotionally to events impacting the self or others.
Oatley’s (1992, 1994) analysis of the emotion-eliciting characteristics of narrative
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1There is much empirical precedence for this assumption, as revealed in studies aimed at identifying
individual differences in subjects’ proneness to feel guilty and ashamed. These studies show strong links
between children’s reports of their imagined emotions to imagined situations and parental or teacher
reports of the same children’s actual emotional responses in real situations (e.g. Ferguson & Stegge, 1995;
Tangney, Wagner, Burggraf, Gramzow & Fletcher, 1991). As another example, Lake, Lane & Harris
(1995) found that children attributing high (versus low) guilt to a story character were less (versus more)
likely to actually commit the same transgression themselves.
fiction would also lead us to expect close parallels between emotion reports in
response to imagined events and emotion reports in response to real-life equivalents
of the same kind of events. Oatley argued that when understanding a story ‘we use
ourselves to simulate the character whose actions are being described. We personally
experience emotions resulting from the plan and the events that result’ (Oatley, 1992,
p. 156).
In line with Oatley’s analysis, Harris (1989) also argued that when adults or
children identify with a story character, the simulation process can result in them
actually experiencing the emotions that are appropriate for that character or in them
imagining the emotions of the story character. We assume that people’s emotional
reactions (be they imagined or real) to these situations bear some equivalence to their
actual emotional responses to real-life equivalents of the same kind of situation. If
correct, this conclusion implies that imagined emotional responses to imagined
situations can be used to test hypotheses about real emotions in real situations (cf.
footnote 1).
Based on these ideas, we decided to test hypotheses about subjects’ actual feelings
of guilt in response to real-life situations, using their reports of imagined guilt in
response to situations drawn from the realm of their own personal experience2.
Accordingly, we asked college students to imagine themselves having perpetrated
incidents of harm that were drawn from incidents that had been generated by other
adults in a previous study. Specifically, students imagined that they destroyed the
precious, inherited property of a valued other (either their best friend or mother)3
under each of three conditions of causal responsibility (accidental, foreseeable,
unjustifiably intended). They subsequently rated how guilty they imagined
themselves to feel immediately after perpetrating the harm as well as an entire day
later. In addition, they rated their perceived blameworthiness and causal
responsibility and the responses they anticipated from the victim (anger,
disappointment, and a changed impression of the perpetrator as a person).
If, as Baumeister et al. claim, guilty feelings reflect primarily a concern with
maintaining important personal relationships, then reports of imagined guilt should
covary positively with events representing increasing threats to the relationship and
with measures of the assumed impact of one’s behaviour on the victim, regardless of
when the reported guilt occurs. If, on the other hand, guilty feelings reflect an
interplay between intrapsychic and interpersonal factors, then such relationships
should only be found after time has passed.
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2Although adults can easily generate autobiographical accounts of guilt-provoking incidents, such
accounts were not used in the present study, because they are an admixture of information regarding the
objective facts of the event and the subjects’ own subsequent strategies for disclaiming or accounting for
the event as time progressed (e.g. Ferguson, Eyre & Stegge, 1996). Since the very temporal aspects of the
event in which we are interested are complexly interrelated to the psychological resolutions that
participants seem to automatically offer in recounting painful incidents, the use of autobiographical
incidents would not be a wise choice.
3The present study is based on the adult data of a larger project designed to ascertain developmental
differences in the relationship between emotion, moral responsibility, and counterfactual thinking. The
mom and friend conditions were included to test developmental hypotheses about the role that significant
others’ reactions play in affecting the emotion–responsibility link, but they are not a focus of the present
study.
METHOD
Participants and design
Students (119 females, 79 males) in an introductory psychology class at a university
in the Rocky Mountain region of the U.S.A. participated in the study in return for
extra credit. The larger number of females than males is representative of general
education classes. A 2 (victim: mom versus best friend) 63 (responsibility level:
accidental, foreseeable, unjustifiably intended) mixed design was used.
Approximately one-half of the males and females received scenarios in which their
best friend was presented as the victim; the victim for remaining participants was
depicted as their mother. Each student responded to three incidents of property
damage, depicted as accidental, foreseeable, or unjustifiably intended.
Procedure and stimulus materials
Students picked up a packet at the beginning of their General Psychology class,
consisting of an informed consent form, scenario descriptions, and three
questionnaires. They were instructed to read and sign the informed consent form
if they wished to participate. They were then given 50 minutes of class time to
complete the questionnaires. The few students who did not finish were told that they
had no more than 1 week to return the completed packet.
The to-be-imagined scenarios were drawn from a previous study in which parents
generated guilt-eliciting situations. In each scenario included in the questionnaire,
the student was depicted as visiting his or her mother’s (or best friend’s) house. The
scenarios took place in the living room, where the perpetrator initially was sitting on
the couch, reading. Toward the end of the scenario, the student/perpetrator breaks
the valuable and treasured vase belonging to the mother (friend). Perpetrators
caused the damage (a) by accident (while walking toward the bookcase to retrieve a
book, the family’s gigantic dog excitedly jumps up and knocks them into a bookcase,
causing the vase to come tumbling to the floor), (b) with foreseeability (en route to
the bookcase, perpetrators are not watching where they’re walking, thereby running
into it, causing it to pitch forward, and the vase to fall), or (c) with unjustifiable
intent (just as the perpetrator arrives at the bookcase, the mom/best friend enters the
room, arbitrarily and persistently demanding that the perpetrator help out in the
house. The perpetrator becomes impulsively angry at the mom/best friend, grabs
‘something’, and ends up hurling the vase to the ground, breaking it). We ensured
that all six possible presentation orders were presented to approximately equal
numbers of male and female participants.
Dependent measures
Following each scenario, participants answered 25 questions on a 7-point scale
(1=not at all, 7=to an extra extremely great extent). Nine questions that were
relevant to the purposes of the present study will be presented here. The remaining
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questions addressed other aspects of a larger research project (see footnote 3) and do
not need to be reported here. Several different question presentation orders were
randomly generated. In half of the presentation orders used, we ensured that
participants were first queried about their imagined guilt at time 1 and later about
their feelings of guilt at time 2. In the remaining half, participants were first asked
about their feelings of guilt at time 2 and later about their time 1 guilty feelings. We
placed two further restrictions on these presentation orders. First, no participant
ever answered the same questions in the same order across the three scenarios.
Second, for all participants, the first posed question about imagined guilt had to
appear at least one full physical page earlier than the second question posed about
imagined guilt. There were approximately eight questions per page. At the bottom of
each page, subjects were instructed not to return to any of the previous pages.
Proctors were present during testing, who walked around the room ensuring that
participants did not flip back and forth in the questionnaire. No violations were
noted, which is understandable given time constraints on completing the packet. The
question presentation orders were also randomly coupled to the six scenario
presentation orders.
Of the questions posed to participants, the following are relevant for the present
purposes: (1) How GUILTY DO YOU FEEL that the vase is broken? (2) Now,
imagine that an entire day has passed since the incident with the vase. How
GUILTY DO YOU NOW FEEL that the vase is broken? (3) How much are you to
blame that the vase is broken? (4) How ANGRY is _______ at you for the broken
vase? (5) How DISAPPOINTED is _______ in you for breaking the vase? (6) How
much is _______’s impression of you as a person CHANGED? (7) How much did
you INTEND to break the vase? (8) How much could you have AVOIDED
breaking the vase? and (9) How justifiable were your MOTIVES for breaking the
vase? The victim’s anticipated reaction was represented by respondents’ average
ratings of anger and disappointment for each scenario (r=0.62, range=0.49 to 0.75
across the three scenarios).
RESULTS
Manipulation checks
In order to test the main predictions, we first need to assess whether the events
depicting the three levels of responsibility were perceived as expected, i.e. as
progressively more avoidable, more intentional, worthier of self-blame, and likelier
to elicit negative responses from the victim proceeding from the accidental to the
unjustifiably intended level. To this end, we subjected the scores for all of the
manipulation check questions to separate 2 (victim)63 (level of responsibility)
MANOVAs, treating responsibility level as a repeated measures factor4. We also
tested for linear and quadratic trends across the three levels for all measures except
the motive justification question. For this question, it does not make conceptual
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4All analyses were also carried out including participant sex as a factor. Although some significant effects
including sex were obtained, the results for both males and females were fully consistent with those
described in the text for the group as a whole.
sense to assess changes in perception across the three levels of responsibility, since
motive was specified for the unjustifiably intended incident only. All of the
MANOVAs revealed statistically significant main effects of level of responsibility,
with uniformly significant linear effects and, with few exceptions, additionally
significant (albeit smaller) quadratic effects. The linear effects for each of the
measures avoidability, intentionality, self-blame, the victim’s anticipated reaction,
and change in the victim’s perception of the perpetrator were, respectively: Fs (1,
196) 1286.09, 689.13, 1305.84, 891.86, and 774.13, ps50.001. The quadratic effects
for each of the measures avoidability, intentionality, self-blame, the victim’s
anticipated reaction, and change in the victim’s perception of the perpetrator
were, respectively: Fs (1, 196) 59.21, 322.96, 43.67, 1.93 (n.s.), and 6.94, ps50.009.
Across the three levels of responsibility, perpetrators thus perceived the damage as
progressively more avoidable and intended, themselves as more blameworthy, the
victim as more disappointed and angry, and the victim as having changed more their
perceptions of the perpetrator (mean scores depicted in Table 1).
Several incidental effects were significant in these analyses. For the avoidability
question, participants perceived themselves as being able to avoid the damage more
when the property belonged to their mother rather than a friend (Ms=4.81 versus
4.58), F (1, 196)=4.51, p50.04. At the same time, they perceived the mother’s
impression of them as changing less than their friend’s (Ms=3.00 versus 3.58), F (1,
196)=14.95, p50.001. The difference between mother’s versus friend’s perceived
change in impression became increasingly greater proceeding from the accidental
(Ms=1.63 versus 1.81) to foreseeable (Ms=2.84 versus 3.38) to unjustifiably
intended (Ms=4.54 versus 5.54) levels, as revealed in a significant level of
responsibility6victim interaction, F (2, 195)=5.93, p50.003. Only the latter
difference was significant by post-hoc comparisons ( p50.04).
Finally, the victim6level of responsibility MANOVA on scores for the motive
justification question revealed a significant main effect of level of responsibility only,
F (2, 195)=33.25, p50.001. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that the perpetrator’s
motives were seen as significantly more justified in the accidental compared to either
the foreseeable or unjustifiably intended scenarios ( ps50.05).
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Table 1. Mean ratings of causality, blame, and anticipated victim reactions at each level of
responsibility
Accidental Foreseeable Unjustifiably
intended
Avoidability 2.41 (1.21) 5.26 (1.44) 6.43 (0.97)
Intentionality 1.28 (1.01) 1.43 (1.13) 5.32 (1.93)
Self-blame 2.39 (1.35) 5.18 (1.59) 6.51 (0.83)
Victim’s anticipated reactions: anger/
disappointment
2.64 (2.79) 4.48 (3.01) 6.05 (2.14)
Victim’s anticipated reactions: impression
change
1.72 (1.03) 3.11 (1.57) 5.04 (1.68)
Motive justifiability 3.99 (2.45) 2.67 (1.72) 2.31 (1.62)
Note. Higher numbers indicate greater presence of the attribute (7-point scale). Standard deviations are in
parentheses.
Main analyses
We have just shown that perpetrators perceive the transgressions as a greater threat
to their relationships and more worthy of blame, the greater their self-ascribed causal
responsibility. From Baumeister et al.’s perspective, we should thus expect
perpetrators to report progressively greater feelings of guilt across the three
responsibility levels, regardless of the time elapsed. McGraw, in contrast, would
predict stronger feelings of guilt for unintended than intended incidents of damage,
again presumably regardless of time. We, on the other hand, think that time will play
a significant role in which of the predictions is borne out—with the McGraw pattern
predicted for time 1, but the Baumeister et al. pattern for time 2.
To examine these different possibilities, a 2 (victim)62 (time)63 (level of
responsibility) MANOVA was conducted on participants’ ratings of immediate and
delayed feelings of guilt, treating the latter two factors as repeated measures. The
analysis revealed significant effects of time, F (1, 196)=10.12, p50.002,
responsibility, F (2, 195)=88.89, p50.001, and time6responsibility, F (2,
195)=65.61, p50.001. As seen in Figure 1, guilty feelings declined from time 1 to
time 2 for the accidental and foreseeable events, but increased for the unjustifiably
intended events. Another way of examining this effect is to conduct separate trend
analyses at times 1 and 2. Separate analyses conducted for guilty ratings at time 1
revealed a significant quadratic effect only, F (1, 197)=112.52, p50.001, with
feelings of guilt being rated the highest for foreseeable compared to accidental or
unjustifiably intended incidents, as seen in Figure 1, revealing partial support for
McGraw’s perspective. The same analysis conducted at time 2 revealed both a linear
Temporal dynamics of guilt 667
#1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 27: 659–673 (1997)
Figure 1. Ratings of imagined guilt as a function of time and responsibility
effect, F (2, 196)=263.39, p50.001 and a considerably smaller quadratic effect, F (1,
197)=27.37, p50.001. Across the three levels of responsibility, Figure 1 shows that
guilty feelings at time 2 clearly increased in the linear manner predicted by
Baumeister et al.
Correlational analyses
To examine the relations between anticipated reactions from the victim and
imagined guilt at time 1 versus time 2, two types of correlations were computed. In
line with common practice, we computed correlations across respondents within each
scenario, examining whether the relative rank order of ratings of the victims’
reactions more strongly resembled the rank order of time 2 versus time 1 ratings of
guilt within each of the three scenarios. However, in this study, it makes even more
sense to examine whether the ratings across the scenarios themselves were similarly
rank ordered for ratings of victim reactions compared to ratings of guilt at time 1
versus time 2. Therefore, we not only computed traditional within-scenario, across-
participant correlations between ratings of anticipated victim reactions and imagined
guilt at time 1 and time 2 (see Table 2), but the same correlations were also computed
for each individual participant across the three scenarios that they rated.
To ascertain whether the correlations at time 1 and time 2 differed across
participants and within scenarios, t-tests for dependent correlations were conducted.
As shown in Table 2, ratings of the victim’s expected change in impression are
significantly more highly correlated with imagined guilt at time 2 than at time 1 for
the foreseeable and unjustifiably intended scenarios. Ratings of the victim’s anger
and disappointment are significantly more highly correlated with imagined guilt at
time 2 than at time 1 for the unjustifiably intended scenario.
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Table 2. Correlations between imagined guilt and each of the victim’s anticipated reactions
at each level of responsibility
Time 1 guilt Time 2 guilt t (195)
Accidental
Victim’s anticipated reactions: anger/
disappointment
0.36*** 0.28*** 71.44
Victim’s anticipated reactions: impression
change
0.15* 0.26*** 1.68
Foreseeable
Victim’s anticipated reactions: anger/
disappointment
0.34*** 0.45*** 1.58
Victim’s anticipated reactions: impression
change
0.07 0.33*** 3.36**
Unjustifiably intended
Victim’s anticipated reactions: anger/
disappointment
0.02 0.24*** 2.43*
Victim’s anticipated reactions: impression
change
70.02 0.22** 2.70**
Note. Significance levels are for two-tailed tests. *p50.05; **p50.01; ***p50.001. t-values represent tests
of the difference between correlations at time 1 versus time 2 for each dependent measure.
The average within-participant, across-scenario correlations between the victim’s
anticipated anger/disappointment and imagined guilt at time 1 versus time 2, were
0.19 (S.D.=0.73) versus 0.67 (S.D.=0.52), respectively. The corresponding
correlations for the victim’s anticipated impression change were 0.07 (S.D.=0.75)
versus 0.65 (S.D.=0.49), respectively. We then entered Fisher’s z transformations of
each participant’s correlations as scores into two separate within-subjects analyses of
variance, treating time as the only factor5. The time 1 versus time 2 differences were
significant ( ps50.001) for correlations between victim’s anticipated anger/
disappointment and guilt, F (1, 174)=53.67, and for correlations between victim’s
anticipated impression change and guilt, F (1, 169)=65.36.
DISCUSSION
The results indicate that reports of imagined guilt covary positively with events
representing increasing levels of responsibility, but only after time has elapsed. As
such, guilt immediately after the event follows the pattern predicted by McGraw,
whereas guilt at a later time shows the trend implied in Baumeister et al.’s analysis.
Thus, both McGraw’s and Baumeister et al.’s assertions are legitimate within
restricted windows of time. The time-limited validity of their positions testifies to the
need to reformulate aspects of each of them.
McGraw argued that perpetrators do not feel guilty after having caused harm
malevolently, because they have had the time and opportunity to justify their deed
before actually committing it. The present finding of a time-related increase in guilt
for unjustifiably intended harm, raises the question of why perpetrators consider the
justification to be satisfactory as they are committing the act, but not 1 day later. To
parsimoniously account for this shift with time, McGraw would need to argue that
perpetrators actually change their minds regarding the justification’s adequacy. We
suggest, in contrast, that perpetrators do not necessarily undergo a change in
attitude regarding how justified they were, but that they take a different perspective
on their behaviour at times 1 and 2. Admittedly, perpetrators who malevolently
cause harm at time 1 will have perfectly good reasons for acting at that moment.
Characteristic of the actors’ demeanour, however, is a failure to consider whether
these reasons will withstand the scrutiny of other persons, including the victim.
Either because of distraction produced by arousal or deliberate decision,
perpetrators seem to refuse initially to evaluate their own reasons for acting from
the perspective of other persons, thereby failing to consider whether others see their
behaviour as justified.
Although we have no independent check on whether the time 2 reports of
imagined guilt actually reflected a different perspective when compared to time 1
imagined guilt, correlations between ratings of anticipated responses from the victim
and imagined guilt bear us out. The within-participant correlations showed that guilt
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5Fisher’s z cannot be computed when the correlation coefficient is 1.00, prompting us to replace these
values with 0.9999 before computing Fisher’s z. Some participants gave identical ratings of at least one of
the variables entering into the correlational analyses, resulting in zero variance, and the need to exclude
these individuals from computation of the within-subject correlations. (Ns were 6, 1, 15, and 10 for
impression change, anger/disappointment, time 1 guilt, and time 2 guilt, respectively).
was less strongly linked to the two victim reaction measures at time 1 than at time 2.
In addition, when each of the events was examined separately, the correlations
between guilt and measures of the victims’ responses were in most cases lower at time
1 than at time 2 and especially so in the unjustifiably intended scenario. To us, this
indicates that the victim’s response to the situation in this scenario mattered little in
inducing initial feelings of guilt, but that these same responses started to play a larger
role in affecting feelings of guilt with the passage of time.
As time passes, perpetrators are likely to be confronted— if only in their own
thoughts—with victims’ and bystanders’ negative emotional reactions to their
actions, and thereby with the fact that their behaviour poses a threat to existing and
future relationships (cf. Greenspan, 1995). Accordingly, perpetrators can no longer
permit themselves to ignore the interpersonal perspective which they disregarded at
time 1 and thus they reevaluate their own reasons for acting from an interpersonal
perspective. In the case of unjustifiably intended harm, this process will eventually
force perpetrators to admit that there really was no justification for their behaviour.
This admission would then promote relatively higher post-transgression feelings of
guilt.
This interpretation actually aligns neatly with Baumeister et al.’s account of
feelings of guilt. The relative lack of guilt at time 1 for unjustifiably caused harm
likely reflects an impoverished sensitivity to the interpersonal concerns that
Baumeister et al. deem so essential for feeling guilty. At the same time, our
explanatory framework casts doubt on the validity of their claim that responsibility
merely plays a secondary role in promoting feelings of guilt. Baumeister et al. seem
to view assigning a central role to responsibility in explaining guilt-induction as
being inconsistent with an interpersonal account. We, on the other hand, can cite at
least two reasons for considering notions of responsibility to be a critical ingredient
of an interpersonal account of guilt induction. First, as Baumeister et al.
acknowledge, the effect that harmful behaviour has on the victim’s and
bystanders’ willingness to have a future relationship with the perpetrator will
strongly depend on the extent to which they hold the individual responsible for the
action. Second, in our view, the very act of evaluating responsibility for harm entails
the perpetrator’s attempt to look at their behaviour from an interpersonal
perspective. That is, when evaluating their own responsibility, perpetrators
examine whether there are causes or reasons for the behaviour that will, or at
least should be, accepted by others as indicating that they do not deserve to be fully
blamed for having caused harm (e.g. Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981).
To cast doubt on our interpretation, one might question the validity of our
measures—arguing that participants’ ratings of guilt say little about how guilty they
would feel in real-life equivalents of the presented situations. One might argue
further that participants were simply revealing their ‘implicit theories’ about guilty
feelings, providing reasoned deductions about (a) the links between responsibility
and guilty feelings and (b) how the intensity of guilty feelings changes with time.
Considering the within-subjects nature of our design, the unrelenting critic could
additionally assert that participants were even cued to synthesize on-the-spot, ad-hoc
theories about the links among responsibility, guilty feelings, and time.
We are suspicious of an unarticulated ‘demand’ or ‘reasoning-based’
interpretation. Admittedly, there may have been demands to differentiate among
the levels of responsibility or between questions about guilt at times 1 and 2.
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However, we find it difficult to fathom how participants could have deduced the
complex interactive pattern of results, without relying on knowledge of how guilty
they have felt in past situations. After all, the interactive time–guilt–responsibility
relation is not even accepted in the psychological literature, let alone being well-
explicated in popular culture— so where did participants draw this complex
knowledge from? In our view, participants could honour a possible demand to
differentiate between scenarios or questions in only one of two ways. First,
participants could have provided random responses to the questions across the
scenarios, which they obviously did not do. Second, participants could have used
their own imaginative capabilities to honour a possible demand to differentiate.
Explaining the results in terms of ‘demand’ thus amounts to restating our own
interpretation of the results—participants produced the interactive pattern of results
by imagining how guilty they would feel at various times in each of the situations
presented. Similarly, given the lack of explicit a priori knowledge about guilt–time–
responsibility relationships, a ‘reasoning’ interpretation also is not inconsistent with
our claim that participants’ responses reflect their imagined feelings of guilt.
Those accepting the validity of our measures might still disagree that a change in
perspective is what accounts for shifts in guilt with time. That is, since we depicted
the perpetrator of unjustifiable harm as being angry, the relative lack of guilt for
unjustifiable harm at time 1 might reflect people’s belief that it is impossible to feel
anger and guilt simultaneously. Thus, participants may only have imagined
themselves as feeling guiltier as anger subsided, regardless of issues of
responsibility. We also doubt the validity of this interpretation for two reasons.
First, the time 1 pattern of guilty feelings that we report for unjustifiably—or
angrily-intended harm (compared to accidental or foreseeable harm) is almost
identical to the pattern reported by McGraw. Yet McGraw explicitly asked
participants to consider hypothetical events (Study 1) or recall actual
autobiographical incidents (Study 2) of unjustifiably intended harm that were ‘. . .
not provoked in any way by the recipient of the harm’ (1987, p. 251). Thus,
McGraw’s participants presumably were not angry about their intentional,
unjustifiable actions, but ours were. Nevertheless, regardless of whether
respondents were initially angry (our study) or were not (McGraw’s studies), they
did not see themselves as experiencing intense immediate feelings of guilt for events
that they had intentionally and unjustifiably caused.
Second, this alternative explanation fails to consider why, once the anger has
subsided, the person should necessarily report greater feelings of guilt for their angry
behaviour, as we found in the present study. Why, for example, would participants
not merely report the same degree of guilt or even lower levels at a later point in
time? In our view, the ‘why’ question can only be answered by introducing a
particular change in perspective that can take place with time. Most well-socialized
individuals care about others and do not wish to do them harm. They know, too,
that it is in poor taste—at the very least— to damage another’s property. However,
they assume this particular perspective on the event only after time has passed and
the anger has subsided. Moreover, the anger itself subsides, in part, because they had
the time to contemplate the justifiability of their action, and realized in the interim
that it was truly unjustified. Not all individuals will react in the same way or undergo
this particular shift in perspective. For example, had we changed the relationship
between perpetrator and victim to one of arch enemies rather than intimate relatives
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or friends, we might easily imagine no shift in perspective. In this case, participants
might have maintained a high level of anger by obsessively ruminating over their
initial ill treatment and may thus also have later maintained their previously reported
low levels of guilt. Our explanation, consonant with that offered by Baumeister et al.,
nevertheless still holds: the emotion of guilt— in fact, any emotion— represents a
particular perspective on the situation. Emotions are not single, isolated events
emanating from within an individual, but are constituted intersubjectively between
individuals, reflecting a shared understanding and regulation of events (Lutz, 1988).
And, when the emotion is a ‘moral’ one (such as guilt or anger), shifts in perspective
regarding responsibility play a preeminent role (Greenspan, 1995).
In conclusion, the emotion of guilt must be contextually understood in terms of
the individual’s ongoing shifts in perspective on responsibility. Neither guilt nor any
emotion is a structured whole, but a dynamic process whose quality will change with
the person’s immediate goals and relationships (Fogel, Nwokah, Dedo, Messinger,
Dickson, Matusov & Holt, 1992). This view adds a richness to our understanding of
emotional experience and acknowledges that measurement needs to pay serious
attention to assessing not just the experience of guilt, but experiences of guilt across
time, as they reflect ever changing interplays between the person’s internal and
external environment.
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